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In last week’s long-awaited judgment in the case Consorzio Italian Management, the
CJEU had the opportunity to revisit the exceptions to the national courts’ obligation
to refer preliminary questions under Art. 267(3) TFEU. Advocate General Bobek,
among others, argued that this was the right moment for the CJEU to loosen its
almost forty years old, overly strict, and practically unfeasible Cilfit exceptions. The
CJEU’s Grand Chamber judgment, however largely maintained the strict approach
regarding the obligation to refer. Thereby, at first sight, the judgment admits of little
trust in the national courts’ handling of EU law. Upon closer inspection, however, it
can also be argued that the CJEU implicitly approves the current practice of de facto
considerable discretion for the national courts by maintaining its jurisprudence.
The Time for Change
Bobek was the last in line of several Advocates General who argued for a revision of
the Cilfit exceptions to the national courts’ obligation to refer. The debate focuses on
the third exception, namely the acte clair doctrine, which entails that national courts
of final instance may refrain from referring preliminary questions when the answer
to a question of EU law is so clear that it leaves no scope for any reasonable doubt.
The acte clair doctrine is criticised for two main points: first, the practical unfeasibility
of this exception, and second, its excessive strictness.
Regarding the practical feasibility, it has been pointed out numerous times that in
order to reach the conclusion that a question of EU law is an acte clair, the national
judge awaits a Herculean task. The national court must namely ascertain that the
issue is equally clear for all other European judges, taking into account the 23
different language versions of the respective EU law norm, the peculiar EU law
terminology, and the objectives and state of evolution of EU law as a whole. In
his opinion in an earlier case, this illusive endeavour tempted Advocate General
Wahl to compare the likeliness of coming across a true acte clair, to the chance
of encountering a unicorn. No judge could ever fulfil these criteria today. A new
approach which can actually be practically applied by the national courts is therefore
necessary.
When considering what this new approach should look like, Advocate General Bobek
argued that it was time for the CJEU to let go of its excessive strictness. In line with
several of his colleagues, he felt that the national courts had matured sufficiently to
allow them more responsibility in assessing the need to refer preliminary questions.
In essence, Bobek proposed to shift the focus to the negative side of the obligation
to refer: in the light of the CJEU’s workload, and the delay which a preliminary
reference brings about for the national proceedings, the inflow of preliminary
references should be limited, rather than stimulated, by clarifying which questions
should not be referred. To that end, Bobek proposed that the CJEU should base the
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national court’s obligation to refer on a clear distinction between the interpretation of
the law on the one hand, which is the responsibility of the CJEU, and its application
on the other, which should be left to the national courts.
The Reluctance of the CJEU
In its judgment, however, the CJEU addresses the obligation to refer from the
opposite, positive angle. It is not concerned with filtering out unwanted preliminary
questions. On the contrary, the approach of the CJEU remains one of ensuring that
the national courts do not deviate from their obligation to refer all too easily. The
CJEU rules, exactly 39 years after Cilfit, that the three exceptions from that decision
remain in place, with only a few slight adjustments to the acte clair doctrine. The
CJEU even emphasises that where one of the Cilfit exceptions might be applicable,
the national courts remain competent to nevertheless refer preliminary questions
when deemed appropriate (para. 37).
As to the test under the acte clair doctrine in abstract terms, the CJEU almost exactly
repeats the conditions developed in 1982 (para. 40-46). A first notable adjustment
is the fact that the issue ‘only’ has to be equally clear for the national courts of
final instance, rather than for every single national court in the EU (para. 40). This
followed, however, already implicitly from the CJEU’s earlier judgments in Van Dijk
and Ferreira da Silva, in which concrete rules were laid down on situations which do
and do not preclude a national court from invoking the acte clair doctrine. There is
one slight relaxation though. In Ferreira da Silva, the CJEU held that the situation of
“conflicting lines of case-law at national level” and “difficulties of interpretation in the
various Member States” preclude the national court from deviating from its obligation
to refer (para. 44). In its present judgment, the CJEU nuances this, ‘merely’ requiring
the national court to be “particularly vigilant” in its assessment in such situations
(para. 49).
Together with this slight relaxation, the CJEU also slightly tightens the obligation to
refer in a different respect. For the first time, the CJEU stipulates that when relying
on one of the three Cilfit exceptions, Art. 47(2) Charter obliges the national courts to
state the reason for their decision on the basis of these three exceptions (para. 51).
That duty to provide reasons effectively constitutes an additional control mechanism
of the national courts’ compliance with their obligation to refer. It should be noted,
though, that such a duty already existed under the ECtHR’s case law on Art. 6(1)
ECHR. Therefore, one could argue that the CJEU has done nothing more here than
complying with its obligation under Art. 52(3) Charter to ensure at least the same
level of protection as the ECHR under corresponding provisions. Nevertheless,
at the end of the day, a duty to state reasons does add an extra safeguard to the
obligation to refer, at least on paper.
As to the feasibility of the required test, the conclusion is as well that the CJEU has
done little to address the issue in its judgment. Only at one point does the CJEU
admit that the importance of the different language versions in assessing whether
a question is an acte clair, cannot reasonably require a national court to compare
each of the 23 different language versions of a provision. The national court must
- 2 -
therefore “bear in mind” the possible divergences between language versions,
especially when these divergences are pointed out by the parties to the national
dispute (para. 44). Apart from this, however, no efforts have been made by the CJEU
to improve the practical feasibility of the national courts’ assessment.
Saying A, Doing B?
In conclusion, the CJEU’s judgment at first sight does not express a feeling of trust
in the national courts’ capacities to deal with issues of EU law on their own. In
contrast to Advocate General Bobek, the approach of the CJEU remains focused on
ensuring that the national courts do not deviate from their obligation to refer all too
easily. One might infer from this that, contrary to the several Advocates General, the
CJEU does not have enough faith in the maturity of the national courts to allow them
more discretion. And perhaps, this lack of trust is very much justified. The CJEU’s
Directorate-General for Library, Research and Documentation published a research
note from May 2019 on “the application of the Cilfit case-law by national courts or
tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law”.
This note concluded that in most Member States, there is no clear operationalisation
of the acte clairdoctrine. The national courts often alleviate themselves from their
duty to refer by simply stating that the point of EU law in question admits of no
reasonable doubt. Moreover, recent empirical studies (see here, and the author’s
forthcoming PhD dissertation) show that the motives of national courts to refer or not,
vary strongly, and are based on different factors than stipulated in Cilfit.
An alternative reading of the judgment is, however, that the CJEU is actually quite
content with the status quo. The CJEU knows very well what the inflow of preliminary
references on the basis of its standing case law is. It knows that the national courts
do not apply the acte clair doctrine rigidly. It knows that most national courts allow
themselves more discretion in assessing the need to refer. So if the CJEU is
generally satisfied with the inflow of preliminary questions based on the law as it
stands, even though this practice does not strictly reflect the CJEU’s case law, why
would the CJEU then change anything? By explicitly loosening the obligation to refer,
the CJEU might unintentionally signal to the national courts that they may relax their
current practice. By maintaining the law as it stands, the CJEU implicitly approves
the current practice of national courts taking considerable discretion in deciding
whether to refer.
What speaks in favour of the latter reading is that the CJEU’s judgment has not
addressed the enforceability of the obligation to refer. It is this lack of enforceability
which allows the national courts the de facto discretion in deciding whether to
refer. And in fact, the current judgment has only reduced this enforceability. Where
Ferreira da Silva initially drew quite a concrete line as to when a national court is
strictly obliged to refer preliminary questions, the CJEU now blurs this line by turning
an absolute obligation into the requirement of ‘particular vigilance’. Moreover, the
CJEU acknowledges the duty to state reasons when a national court invokes one
of the three Cilfit exceptions. Yet it does not provide any conditions for how explicit
and specific this statement of reasons must be, making this duty, at least for the time
being, nothing more than an empty shell.
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If the CJEU had really wanted to increase the number of preliminary references
with a strict approach to the obligation to refer, the CJEU would have been well
aware that it should have seriously addressed the lack of feasibility of the acte
clair doctrine. Because even at the Kirchberg, one will not encounter any unicorns.
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